# CS 88: Security and Privacy

# 19: DNS and UDP

#### 04-11-2024

#### slides adapted from Dave Levine, Jim Kurose



# Reading Quiz



#### Send information from one computer to another





# We only need...

- Manage complexity and scale up
- Naming and addressing
- Moving data to the destination
- Reliability and fault tolerance
- Resource allocation, Security, Privacy..

## Five-Layer Internet Model

Application: the application (e.g., the Web, Email)

Transport: end-to-end connections, reliability

Network: routing

Link (data-link): framing, error detection

Physical: 1's and 0's/bits across a medium (copper, the air, fiber)













## Layering and encapsulation



## Abstraction!

- Hides the complex details of a process
- Use abstract representation of relevant properties make reasoning simpler
- Ex: Alice and Bob's knowledge of postal system:
  - Letters with addresses go in, come out other side

# TCP/IP Protocol Stack



# TCP/IP Protocol Stack



# The "End-to-End" Argument



Don't provide a function at lower layer if you have to do it at higher layer anyway ... ... unless there is a very good performance reason to do so.

Examples: error control, quality of service

Reference: Saltzer, Reed, Clark, "End-To-End Arguments in System Design," ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, Vol. 2 (4), pp. 277-288, 1984.

# Threat modeling for network attacks

Basic security goals:

- **Confidentiality:** No one should be able to read our data/communications unless we want them to.
- Integrity: No one can manipulate our data/communications unless we want them to.
- Availability: We can access our data/communication capabilities when we want to.

## Network Attacks: Classes of Attackers

- MiTM: Can see packets, and can modify and drop packets
- On-path: Can see packets, but can't modify or drop packets
- Off-path: Can't see, modify, or drop packets



Which type of attacker is more powerful?

- A. on-path
- B. off-path
- C. neither is strictly stronger than the other

#### DNS: a distributed, hierarchical database



# Goals of DNS

#### A wide-area distributed database

Possibly biggest such database in the world!

#### Goals

- Scalability; decentralized maintenance
- Robustness
- Global scope
- Names mean the same thing everywhere
- Distributed updates/queries
- Good performance

# **DNS: Application Layer Protocol**

- distributed database
  - implemented in hierarchy of many name servers.
- application-layer protocol:
  - hosts communicate to name servers
  - resolve names  $\rightarrow$  addresses
- Core Internet function, implemented as application-layer protocol

# DNS: Domain Name System

People: many identifiers:

• name, swat ID, SSN, passport #

Internet hosts (endpoints), routers (devices inside a n/w):

- "name", e.g., www.google.com used by humans
- IP address (32 bit) used for addressing packets

How do we map between IP address and name, and vice versa ?

## **DNS: Root Name Servers**

- Root name server:
  - Knows how to find top-level domains (.com, .edu, .gov, etc.)
  - How often does the location of a TLD change?
  - approx. 400 total root servers
  - Significant amount of traffic is not legitimate



#### DNS: a distributed, hierarchical database



#### DNS: a distributed, hierarchical database



# Authoritative Servers

#### Authoritative DNS servers:

- Organization's own DNS server(s), providing authoritative hostname to IP mappings for organization's named hosts
- Can be maintained by organization or service provider, easily changing entries
- Often, but not always, acts as organization's local name server (for responding to look-ups)

# Local DNS Name Server

- Each ISP (residential ISP, company, university) has (at least) one
  - also called "default name server"
- When host makes DNS query, query is sent to its local DNS server
  - has local cache of recent name-to-address translation pairs (but may be out of date!)
  - acts as proxy, forwards query into hierarchy

# Uses of DNS

# Hostname to IP address translation

• Reverse lookup: IP address to hostname translation

Host name aliasing: other DNS names for a host

 Alias hostnames point to canonical hostname

Email: look up domain's mail server by domain name

# Different DNS Mappings





root DNS server

TLD DNS server

dns.cs.umass.edu

gaia.cs.umass.edu

### **DNS** Packet



## **DNS** Packet

#### **DNS requests sent over UDP**

**Four sections:** questions, answers, authority, additional records

**Query ID:** 16 bit random value Links response to query



# Request



# Response



# Authoritative Response



# **Common Security Assumptions**

- Attackers can interact with our systems without particular notice.
- *Probing* (poking at systems) may go unnoticed ...
  - even if highly repetitive, leading to crashes, and easy to detect
  - Attackers can obtain access to a copy of a given system to measure and/or determine how it works
- It's easy for attackers to know general information about their targets:
  - OS types, software versions, usernames, server ports, IP addresses, usual patterns of activity, administrative procedures

# **Common Security Assumptions**

- Attackers can make use of automation they can often find clever ways to automate
- Attackers can pull off complicated coordination across a bunch of different elements/systems
- Attackers can bring large resources to bear if needed computation, network capacity
  - But they are *not* super-powerful (e.g., control entire Internet Service Providers)

# DNS security

#### DNS Vulnerabilities:

- No authentication
- Connectionless transport layer protocol (UDP)

#### **DNS** Attacks:

- Amplification Attack
- Cache Poisoning
- Man-in-the-middle
- DNS Redirection
- DDoS
- DNS Injection



gaia.cs.umass.edu

# Attacking DNS

#### **DDoS** attacks

- Bombard root servers with traffic
  - Not successful to date
  - Traffic Filtering
  - Local DNS servers cache IPs of TLD servers, bypassing root
- Bombard TLD servers
  - Potentially more dangerous

#### **Redirect attacks**

- Man-in-middle
  - Intercept queries
- DNS cache poisoning
  - Send bogus replies to DNS server that caches

#### Exploit DNS for DDoS

- Send queries with spoofed source address: target IP
- Requires amplification

## **DNSSEC** Hierarchy of Trust



# Solution: DNSSEC

- Cryptographically sign critical resource records
  - Resolver can verify the cryptographic signature
- Two new resource types
  - Type = DNSKEY
    - Name = Zone domain name
    - Value = Public key for the zone
  - Type = RRSIG
    - Name = (type, name) tuple, i.e. the query itself
    - Value = Cryptographic signature of the query results





How many answers Time to live in seconds How many additional records?

\$ dig @a.root-servers.net www.freebsd.org +norecurse ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 57494 ;; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 2 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.freebsd.org. Α IΝ ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: b0.org.afilias-nst.org. 172800 IN NS org. d0.org.afilias-nst.org. 172800 IN NS org. ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: b0.org.afilias-nst.org. 172800 IN 199.19.54.1 Α d0.org.afilias-nst.org. Α 199.19.57.1 172800 IN

						How many answers Time to live in seconds How many additional records?
<pre>\$ dig @a.root-servers.net ;; Got answer: ;; -&gt;&gt;HEADER&lt;&lt;- opcode: Q ;; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, A</pre>	www.fr UERY, s UTHORIT	eebsd. tatus: Y: 2,	org +n NOERR ADDITI	orecurse OR, id: ONAL: 2	57494	16-bit transaction identifier that enables the DNS client to match up the reply with it's original
<pre>;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.freebsd.org. ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: org. 17280</pre>	IN IN	A NS	b0.or	g.afilia	as-nst.	request. the question we asked the server type of response A = IP address, and NS = name org.
org. 17280	9 IN	NS	d0.or	g.afilia	as-nst.	org.
<pre>;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: b0.org.afilias-nst.org. d0.org.afilias-nst.org.</pre>	172800 172800	IN IN	A A	199.19 199.19	.54.1 .57.1	
					Glue r	ecords

How many answers? How many additional records?



\$ dig @199.19.54.1 www.freebsd.org +norecurse ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 39912 ;; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 0 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.freebsd.org. Α IN ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: freebsd.org. 86400 IN NS ns1.isc-sns.net. freebsd.org. 86400 ns2.isc-sns.com. IN NS freebsd.org. NS 86400 ΙN ns3.isc-sns.info.

How many answers? what does it mean if the answer s How many additional records?



\$ dig @199.19.54.1 www.freebsd.org +norecurse ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 39912 ;; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 0 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.freebsd.org. Α ΙN ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: freebsd.org. 86400 IN NS ns1.isc-sns.net. freebsd.org. 86400 ns2.isc-sns.com. IN NS freebsd.org. NS 86400 IN ns3.isc-sns.info.



<pre>\$ dig @ns1.isc-sns ;; Got answer: ;; -&gt;&gt;HEADER&lt;&lt;- ope ;; QUERY: 1, ANSWE</pre>	.net ww code: Q R: 1, A	W.fre UERY, UTHOR	ebsd.or status ITY: 3,	g +norecurse : NOERROR, id: 1 ADDITIONAL: 3	L7037
;; QUESTION SECTION;www.freebsd.org.	N:	IN	А		<i>How many answers? what does the answer tell us How many authoritative records?</i>
<pre>;; ANSWER SECTION: www.freebsd.org.</pre>	3600	IN	А	69.147.83.33	what does the authority tell us? How many additional records?
;; AUTHORITY SECTION	ON:				
freebsd.org.	3600	IN	NS	ns2.isc-sns.co	om.
freebsd.org.	3600	IN	NS	ns1.isc-sns.ne	et.
freebsd.org.	3600	IN	NS	ns3.isc-sns.i	nfo.
;; ADDITIONAL SECT:	ION:				
ns1.isc-sns.net.	3600	IN	А	72.52.71.1	
ns2.isc-sns.com.	3600	IN	А	38.103.2.1	
ns3.isc-sns.info.	3600	IN	А	63.243.194.1	



<pre>\$ dig @ns1.isc-sns ;; Got answer: ;; -&gt;&gt;HEADER&lt;&lt;- op ;; QUERY: 1, ANSWE</pre>	.net ww code: Q R: 1, A	W.fre UERY, UTHOR	ebsd.or; status ITY: 3,	g +norecurse : NOERROR, id: 1 ADDITIONAL: 3	.7037
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<pre>freebsd.org. ;; ADDITIONAL SECT</pre>	3600 ION:	IN	NS	ns3.isc-sns.ir	nfo.
ns1.isc-sns.net.	3600	IN	А	72.52.71.1	
ns2.isc-sns.com.	3600	IN	А	38.103.2.1	
ns3.isc-sns.info.	3600	IN	А	63.243.194.1	

# Protocol Layering

- Networks use a stack of protocol layers
  - Each layer has different responsibilities.
  - Layers define abstraction boundaries

Lower layers provide services to layers above

- Don't care what higher layers do

Higher layers use services of layers below

 Don't worry about how the layer below works **Application Layer** 

Transport: end-to-end connections, reliability

Network: routing

Link (data-link): framing, error detection

Physical: 1's and 0's/bits across a medium (copper, the air, fiber)

# Transport Layer perspective

- Networks use a stack of protocol layers
  - Each layer has different responsibilities.
  - Layers define abstraction boundaries
- Lower layers provide services to layers above
  - Don't care what higher layers do
- Higher layers use services of layers below
  - Don't worry about how the layer below works



## Layering and encapsulation



# Ports: An Analogy

- Alice is pen pals with Bob. Alice's roommate, Carol, is also pen pals with Bob
- Bob's replies are addressed to the same global (IP) address
  - How can we tell which letters are for Alice and which are for Bob?
- Solution: Add a room number (port number) inside the letter
  - In private homes, usually a port number is meaningless
  - But, in public offices (servers), like Cory Hall, the port numbers are constant and known



Each application on a host is identified by a *port number* 

TCP connection established between port A on host X to port B on host Y Ports are 1–65535 (16 bits)

Some destination port numbers used for specific applications by convention



## Ports

**Ports** help us distinguish between different applications on the same computer or server

- On private computers, port numbers can be random
- On public servers, port numbers should be constant and well-known (so users can access the right port)



### Common Ports

Port	Application
80	HTTP (Web)
443	HTTPS (E2E encrypted Web)
25	SMTP
22	SSH
23	Telnet
53	DNS

## Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)



- Two army divisions (blue) surround enemy (red)
  - Each division led by a general
  - Both must agree when to simultaneously attack
  - If either side attacks alone, defeat
- Generals can only communicate via messengers
  - Messengers may get captured (unreliable channel)



- How to coordinate?
  - Send messenger: "Attack at dawn"
  - What if messenger doesn't make it?



- How to be sure messenger made it?
  - Send acknowledgment: "I delivered message"

In the "two generals problem", can the two armies reliably coordinate their attack? (using what we just discussed)

- A. Yes (explain how)
- B. No (explain why not)



- Result
  - Can't create perfect channel out of faulty one
  - <u>Can only increase probability of success</u>

# Designing reliability over an unreliable link. What can go wrong?

- A. Packets can be dropped
- B. Packets can arrive out or order
- c. Acknowledgements can arrive out of order
- D. All of the above
- E. There are more issues....

# Designing reliability over an unreliable link. What can go wrong?

- Problem: IP packets have a limited size. To send longer messages, we have to manually break messages into packets
  - When sending packets: TCP will automatically split up messages
  - When receiving packets: TCP will automatically reassemble the packets
  - Now the user doesn't need to manually split up messages!
- Problem: Packets can arrive out of order
  - When sending packets: TCP labels each byte of the message with increasing numbers
  - When receiving packets: TCP can use the numbers to rearrange bytes in the correct order
- Problem: Packets can be dropped
  - When receiving packets: TCP sends an extra message acknowledging that a packet has been received
  - When sending packets: If the acknowledgement doesn't arrive, re-send the packet

# Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)

- Provides a byte stream abstraction
  - Bytes go in one end of the stream at the source and come out at the other end at the destination
  - TCP automatically breaks streams into **segments**,
- Provides ordering
  - Segments contain sequence numbers, so the destination can reassemble the stream in order
- Provides reliability
  - The destination sends acknowledgements (ACKs) for each sequence number received
  - If the source doesn't receive the ACK, the source sends the packet again
- Provides ports
  - Multiple services can share the same IP address by using different ports