

CS 88: Security and Privacy

04: Buffer Overflow and Format String Attacks

09-08-2022



Announcements

- Clickers available through the bookstore and TAP
 - No more paper hand-ins next week ☺

Today

- CS 31 Recap:
 - functions and the stack
 - assembly instructions
- Stack Buffer Overflow

What is a software vulnerability?

- A bug in a program that allows an unprivileged user capabilities that should be denied to them.
- There are a lot of types of vulnerabilities
 - bugs that violate “control flow integrity”
 - why? lets attacker run code on your computer!
- Typically these involve violating assumptions of the programming language or its run-time

Exploiting vulnerabilities (the start)

- Dive into low level details of how exploits work
 - How can a remote attacker get a victim program to execute their code?
- **Threat model:** victim code is handling input that comes from across a security boundary
 - what are examples of this?
- **Security policy:** want to protect **integrity of execution** and **confidentiality of data** from being compromised by malicious and highly skilled users of our system.

Stack buffer overflows

- Understand how buffer overflow vulnerabilities can be exploited
- Identify buffer overflows and asses their impact
- Avoid introducing buffer overflow vulnerabilities
- Correctly fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities


Buffer Overflows

- An anomaly that occurs when a program writes/reads data beyond the boundary of a buffer
- Canonical software vulnerability
 - ubiquitous in system software
 - OSes, web servers, web browsers
- If your program crashes with memory faults, you probably have a buffer overflow vulnerability

CS 31 Recap

Memory


- Abstraction goal: make every process think it has the same memory layout.
 - MUCH simpler for compiler if the stack always starts at 0xFFFFFFFF, etc.
- Reality: there's only so much memory to go around, and no two processes should use the same (physical) memory addresses.



OS (with help from hardware) will keep track of who's using each memory region.

Memory Terminology


Virtual (logical) Memory: The abstract view of memory given to processes. Each process gets an independent view of the memory.



Virtual address space (VAS): fixed size.

0xFFFFFFFF

Physical Memory: The contents of the hardware (RAM) memory. Managed by OS. Only ONE of these for the entire machine!




(Determined by amount of installed RAM.)

Address Space: Range of addresses for a region of memory.

The set of available storage locations.

Memory

- Behaves like a big array of bytes, each with an address (bucket #).
- By convention, we divide it into regions.
- The region at the lowest addresses is usually reserved for the OS.



NULL: A special pointer value.

NULL is equivalent to pointing at memory address 0x0. **This address is NEVER in a valid segment of your program's memory.**

- This guarantees a segfault if you try to dereference it.
- Generally a good idea to initialize pointers to NULL.

0x0


Operating system

0xFFFFFFFF

What happens if we launch an attack where we load an instruction to execute at 0x0

- A. Nothing will happen, this region is mapped to the NULL pointer, which does not have any effect
- B. There will be some effect, but not necessarily devastating
- C. This will have a devastating effect.


0x0



0xFFFFFFFF

Memory - Text


- After the OS, we store the program's code.
- Instructions generated by the compiler.



Memory – (Static) Data

- Next, there's a fixed-size region for static data.
- This stores static variables that are known at compile time.
 - Global variables


0x0



0xFFFFFFFF


Memory - Stack

- At high addresses, we keep the stack.
- This stores local (automatic) variables.
 - The kind we've been using in C so far.
 - e.g., `int x;`




Memory - Stack

- The stack grows upwards towards lower addresses (negative direction).
- Example: Allocating array
 - `int array[4];`




Memory - Heap

- The heap stores dynamically allocated variables.
- When programs explicitly ask the OS for memory, it comes from the heap.
 - `malloc()` function



Instructions in Memory



Process memory layout

.text

- Machine code of executable

.data

- Global initialized variables

.bss

- Below Stack Section
- global uninitialized vars

heap

- Dynamic variables


stack

- Local variables
- Function call data

Env

- Environment variables
- Program arguments

0x0



Process memory layout

.text

- Machine code of executable

.data

- Global initialized variables

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- Below Stack Section
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heap

- Dynamic variables

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
```
int i = 0;
int main()
{
    char *ptr = malloc(sizeof(int));
    char buf[1024]
    int j;
    static int y;
}
```

X86: The De Facto Standard


- Extremely popular for desktop computers
- Alternatives
 - ARM: popular on mobile
 - MIPS: very simple
 - Itanium: ahead of its time
- CISC: 100 distinct opcodes
- Register poor
 - 8 registers of 32 bits
 - only 6 general purpose
- instructions are variable length
 - not aligned at 4 byte boundaries
- lots of backward compatibilities
 - defined in late 70s
 - exploit code that noone pays attention to
- we will use 32 bit because its more convenient.



Compilation Steps (.c to a.out)




Compilers




- Computers don't execute source code
 - Instead, they use machine code
- Compilers translate code from a higher level to a lower one
- In this context, C → assembly → machine code

Machine Code

- Binary (0's and 1's) Encoding of ISA Instructions
 - some bits: encode the instruction (opcode bits)
 - others encode operand(s)
 - 01001010 opcode operands
 - 01 001 010 ADD %r1 %r2
 - different bits fed through different CPU circuitry:



Assembly Code



What is “assembly”?

```
push %ebp  
mov %esp, %ebp  
sub $16, %esp  
movl $10, -8(%ebp)  
movl $20, -4(%ebp)  
movl -4(%ebp), $eax  
addl $eax, -8(%ebp)  
movl -8(%ebp), %eax  
leave
```

Assembly is the
“human readable”
form of the
instructions a
machine can
understand.

```
objdump -d a.out
```

Object / Executable / Machine Code

Assembly

```
push %ebp  
mov %esp, %ebp  
sub $16, %esp  
movl $10, -8(%ebp)  
movl $20, -4(%ebp)  
movl -4(%ebp), $eax  
addl $eax, -8(%ebp)  
movl -8(%ebp), %eax  
leave
```

Machine Code (Hexadecimal)

	55
	89 E5
	83 EC 10
	C7 45 F8 0A 00 00 00
	C7 45 FC 14 00 00 00
	8B 45 FC
	01 45 F8
	B8 45 F8
	C9

Almost a 1-to-1 mapping to Machine Code
Hides some details like num bytes in instructions

Object / Executable / Machine Code


Assembly

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push %ebp  
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sub $16, %esp  
movl $10, -8(%ebp)  
movl $20, -4(%ebp)  
movl -4(%ebp), $eax  
addl $eax, -8(%ebp)  
movl -8(%ebp), %eax  
leave
```

```
int main() {  
    int a = 10;  
    int b = 20;  
  
    a = a + b;  
  
    return a;  
}
```

Processor State in Registers

- Information about currently executing program
 - Temporary data (%eax - %edi)
 - Location of runtime stack (%ebp, %esp)
 - Location of current code control point (%eip, ...)
 - Status of recent tests %EFLAGS (CF, ZF, SF, OF)



General purpose Registers

Register name
%eax
%ecx
%edx
%ebx
%esi
%edi
%esp
%ebp
%eip
%EFLAGS

bits:	16 31	15 8	7 0
%eax	%ax	%ah	%al
%ecx	%cx	%ch	%cl
%edx	%dx	%dh	%dl
%ebx	%bx	%bh	%bl
%esi	%si		
%edi	%di		
%esp	%sp		
%ebp	%bp		

Six are for instruction operands


Can store 4 byte data or address value

The low-order 2 bytes %ax is the low-order 16 bits of %eax

Two low-order 1 bytes %al is the low-order 8 bits of %eax

May see their use in ops involving shorts or chars

Assembly Programmer's View of State



Registers:

PC: Program counter (%eip)

Condition codes (%EFLAGS)

General Purpose (%eax - %ebp)

Memory:

- Byte addressable array
- Program code and data
- Execution stack

Types of IA32 Instructions

- Data movement
 - Move values between registers and memory
 - Example: `movl`
- Load: move data from memory to register
- Store: move data from register to memory

Instruction Syntax

Examples:

```
subl $16, %ebx
```

```
movl (%eax), %ebx
```

- Instruction ends with data length
- opcode, src, dst
- Constants preceded by \$
- Registers preceded by %
- Indirection uses ()


Addressing Mode: Memory

- Accessing memory requires you to specify which address you want.
 - Put address in a register.
 - Access with () around register name.
- `movl (%ecx), %eax`
 - Use the address in register ecx to access memory, store result in register eax

Addressing Mode: Memory


- `movl (%ecx), %eax`
 - Use the address in register ecx to access memory, store result in register eax

name	value
%eax	0
%ecx	0x1A68
...	




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


Addressing Mode: Displacement

- Like memory mode, but with constant offset
 - Offset is often negative, relative to %ebp
- `movl -12(%ebp), %eax`
 - Take the address in ebp, subtract twelve from it, index into memory and store the result in eax


Addressing Mode: Displacement

- `movl -12(%ebp), %eax`
 - Take the address in ebp, subtract twelve from it, index into memory and store the result in eax



Addressing Mode: Displacement

- `movl -12(%ebp), %eax`
 - Take the address in ebp, subtract three from it, index into memory and store the result in eax



What will memory look like after these instructions?

x is 2 at %ebp-8, y is 3 at %ebp-12, z is 2 at %ebp-16

```
movl -16(%ebp), %eax  
sal l $3, %eax  
imull $3, %eax  
movl -12(%ebp), %edx  
addl -8(%ebp), %edx  
addl %edx, %eax  
movl %eax, -8(%ebp)
```

Registers

name	value
%eax	?
%edx	?
%ebp	0x1270

Memory

address	value
0x1260	2
0x1264	3
0x1268	2
0x126c	
0x1270	
...	



What will memory look like after these instructions?

x is 2 at %ebp-8, y is 3 at %ebp-12, z is 2 at %ebp-16

```
movl -16(%ebp), %eax
sall $3, %eax
imull $3, %eax
movl -12(%ebp), %edx
addl -8(%ebp), %edx
addl %edx, %eax
movl %eax, -8(%ebp)
```

A:

address	value
0x1260	53
0x1264	3
0x1268	24
0x126c	
0x1270	
...	

C:

address	value
0x1260	2
0x1264	16
0x1268	24
0x126c	
0x1270	
...	

B:


address	value
0x1260	53
0x1264	3
0x1268	2
0x126c	
0x1270	
...	

D:

address	value
0x1260	2
0x1264	3
0x1268	53
0x126c	
0x1270	
...	


Stack Frame Contents

- What needs to be stored in a stack frame?
 - Alternatively: What must a function know?
- Local variables
- Previous stack frame base address
- Function arguments
- Return value
- Return address
- Saved registers
- Spilled temporaries



Stack Frame Contents


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0xFFFFFFFF


Frame Pointer

- Must maintain invariant:
 - The current function's stack frame is always between the addresses stored in %esp and %ebp
- Must adjust %esp, %ebp on call / return.




Frame Pointer

- Must maintain invariant:
 - The current function's stack frame is always between the addresses stored in %esp and %ebp
- Immediately upon calling a function:
 - `pushl %ebp`



Frame Pointer


- Must maintain invariant:
 - The current function's stack frame is always between the addresses stored in %esp and %ebp
- Immediately upon calling a function:
 - pushl %ebp
 - Set %ebp = %esp



Frame Pointer


- Must maintain invariant:
 - The current function's stack frame is always between the addresses stored in %esp and %ebp
- Immediately upon calling a function:
 - pushl %ebp
 - Set %ebp = %esp
 - Subtract N from %esp

Callee can now execute.




Frame Pointer

- Must maintain invariant:
 - The current function's stack frame is always between the addresses stored in %esp and %ebp
- To return, reverse this:




Frame Pointer

- Must maintain invariant:
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 - set %esp = %ebp



Frame Pointer

- Must maintain invariant:
 - The current function's stack frame is always between the addresses stored in %esp and %ebp
- To return, reverse this:
 - set %esp = %ebp
 - popl %ebp




Frame Pointer

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- To return, reverse this:
 - set %esp = %ebp
 - popl %ebp


} IA32 has another convenience instruction for this: leave

Back to where we started.




Frame Pointer: Function Call


Slide 56




Initial state



`pushl %ebp` (store caller's frame pointer)




`movl %esp, %ebp`
(establish callee's frame pointer)



`subl $SIZE, %esp`
(allocate space for callee's locals)


Frame Pointer: Function Return

Slide 57




Want to restore caller's frame.

IA32 provides a convenience instruction that does all of this:
leave




`movl %ebp, %esp`
(restore caller's stack pointer)



`popl %ebp` (restore caller's frame pointer)

Functions and the Stack




1. pushl %eip
2. jump funcB
3. (execute funcB)


Text Memory Region

```
funcA:  
addl $5, %ecx  
movl %ecx, -4(%ebp)  
...  
call funcB  
addl %eax, %ecx  
...  
  
funcB:  
pushl %ebp  
movl %esp, %ebp  
...  
movl $10, %eax  
leave  
ret
```


Functions and the Stack



Functions and the Stack



Functions and the Stack




Stack Memory Region

1. pushl %eip
2. jump funcB
3. (execute funcB)
4. restore stack
5. popl %eip
6. (resume funcA)

Text Memory Region


```
funcA:  
addl $5, %ecx  
movl %ecx, -4(%ebp)  
...  
call funcB  
addl %eax, %ecx  
...  
  
funcB:  
pushl %ebp  
movl %esp, %ebp  
...  
movl $10, %eax  
leave  
ret
```

Functions and the Stack



1. pushl %eip
 2. jump funcB
 3. (execute funcB)
 4. restore stack
 5. popl %eip
 6. (resume funcA)
- Annotations for the list:
- 2. jump funcB } call
 - 4. restore stack } leave
 - 5. popl %eip } ret

Stack Memory Region




Return address:

Address of the instruction we should jump back to when we finish (return from) the currently executing function.


Register Convention

- Caller-saved: %eax, %ecx, %edx
 - If the caller wants to preserve these registers, it must save them prior to calling callee
 - callee free to trash these, caller will restore if needed
- Callee-saved: %ebx, %esi, %edi
 - If the callee wants to use these registers, it must save them first, and restore them before returning
 - caller can assume these will be preserved

Putting it all together...



Implementing a function call




main:

```
...  
eip  subl    $8, %esp  
eip  movl    $2, 4(%esp)  
eip  movl    $1, (%esp)  
eip  call    foo  
eip  addl    $8, %esp  
...  
...
```

foo:

```
eip  pushl   %ebp  
eip  movl    %esp, %ebp  
eip  subl    $16, %esp  
eip  movl    $3, -4(%ebp)  
eip  movl    8(%ebp), %eax  
eip  addl    $9, %eax  
eip  leave  
eip  ret
```

Arrays




```
void bar(char * in){  
    char name[5];  
    strcpy(name, in);  
}
```

`bar:`

```
pushl %ebp  
movl %esp, %ebp  
subl $5, %esp  
movl 8(%ebp), %eax  
movl %eax, 4(%esp)  
leal -5(%ebp), %eax  
movl %eax, (%esp)  
call strcpy  
leave  
ret
```

Implementing a function call




main:

```
...  
eip  subl    $8, %esp  
eip  movl    $2, 4(%esp)  
eip  movl    $1, (%esp)  
eip  call    foo  
eip  addl    $8, %esp  
...  
...
```

foo:

```
pushl  %ebp  
movl  %esp, %ebp  
subl  $16, %esp  
movl  $3, -4(%ebp)  
movl  8(%ebp), %eax  
addl  $9, %eax  
leave  
ret
```

Arrays




```
void bar(char * in){  
    char name[5];  
    strcpy(name, in);  
}
```

`bar:`

<code>pushl %ebp</code>
<code>movl %esp, %ebp</code>
<code>subl \$5, %esp</code>
<code>movl 8(%ebp), %eax</code>
<code>movl %eax, 4(%esp)</code>
<code>leal -5(%ebp), %eax</code>
<code>movl %eax, (%esp)</code>
<code>call strcpy</code>
<code>leave</code>
<code>ret</code>

Data types / Endianness

- x86 is a little-endian architecture



Buffer Overflows


When is a program secure?

- Formal approach: When it does exactly what it should
 - not more
 - not less
- But how do we know what it is supposed to do?

Example 1

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(int argc, char**argv){
    char nice[] = "is nice.";
    char name[8];
    gets(name);
    printf("%s %s\n", name, nice);
    return 0;
}
```




Function call stack

What happens if we read a long name?

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(int argc, char**argv){
    char nice[] = "is nice.";
    char name[8];
    gets(name);
    printf("%s %s\n", name, nice);
    return 0;
}
```

- A. Nothing bad will happen
- B. Something nonsensical will result
- C. Something terrible will result




HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:

SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?
IF SO, REPLY "POTATO" (6 LETTERS).




User Olivia from London wants pages about 'm...
secure connection using key "4538538374224"
User Meg wants these 6 letters: POTATO. User
Ada wants pages about "irl games". Unlocking
secure records with master key 5130985733435
Lacie/chrome user sends this message: "H...



SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?
IF SO, REPLY "BIRD" (4 LETTERS).




User Olivia from London wants pages about 'm...
bees in car why'. Note: Files for IP 375.381.
283.17 are in /tmp/files-3843. User Meg wants
these 4 letters: BIRD. There are currently 346
connections open. User Brendan uploaded the file
selfie.jpg (contents: 834ba962e2ccb9ff89bd3bfff8)



POTATO



User Olivia from London wants pages about 'm...
secure connection using key "4538538374224"
User Meg wants these 6 letters: POTATO. User
Ada wants pages about "irl games". Unlocking
secure records with master key 5130985733435
Lacie/chrome user sends this message: "H...



HMM...



BIRD


User Olivia from London wants pages about 'm...
bees in car why'. Note: Files for IP 375.381.
283.17 are in /tmp/files-3843. User Meg wants
these 4 letters: BIRD. There are currently 346
connections open. User Brendan uploaded the file
selfie.jpg (contents: 834ba962e2ccb9ff89bd3bfff8)



SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?
IF SO, REPLY "HAT" (500 LETTERS).



a connection. Jake requested pictures of deer.
User Meg wants these 500 letters: HAT. Lucas
requests the "missed connections" page. Eve
(administrator) wants to set server's master
key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about
snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to
change account password to "CoHeBact". User



HAT. Lucas requests the "missed connections" page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server's master key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about "snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to change account password to "CoHeBact". User



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(administrator) wants to set server's master
key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about
snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to
change account password to "CoHeBact". User



Buffer Overflow example

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void foo() {
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa,0bbbbbbbb,argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```


Buffer Overflow example

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void foo() {
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    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    → func(0aaaaaaaa,0bbbbbbbb,argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void foo() {
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    → func(0aaaaaaaa,0bbbbbbbb,argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example

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void foo() {
    printf("hello all!!\n");
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void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
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    strcpy(buf, str);
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int main(int argc, char**argv) {
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    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example

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    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

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    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example

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    exit(0);
}

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    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
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    strcpy(buf, str);
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Buffer Overflow example

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}

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    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa,0bbbbbbbb,argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```

%esp

%ebp →

buf[0-3]
0xdeadbeef
saved ebp
saved ret: eip
0aaaaaaaaa
0bbbbbbbbbb
argv[1]


Buffer Overflow example

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    → int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example

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void foo() {
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

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    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example

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    exit(0);
}

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    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    → char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
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    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example

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#include <string.h>

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    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    → strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example: If the first input is "AAAAAAAAAAAAA"

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void foo() {
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    → strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example: If the first input is "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void foo() {
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
→   strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example: If the first input is "AAAAAAAAAAAAA"

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void foo() { 0x08049b95
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
→   strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Buffer Overflow example: If the first input is "AAAAAAAAAAAAA"

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

→ void foo() { 0x08049b95
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```




Better Hijacking Control

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void foo() {
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```



Jump to attacker supplied code
where?

- put code in the string
- jump to start of the string


Better Hijacking Control

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void foo() {
    printf("hello all!!\n");
    exit(0);
}

void func(int a, int b, char *str) {
    int c = 0xdeadbeef;
    char buf[4];
    strcpy(buf, str);
}

int main(int argc, char**argv) {
    func(0aaaaaaaa, 0bbbbbbbb, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```



Jump to attacker supplied code
where?

- put code in the string
- jump to start of the string

Shellcode

- **Shellcode:** small code fragment that receives initial control in an control flow hijack exploit
 - Control flow hijack: taking control of instruction ptr
- Earliest attacks used shellcode to exec a shell
 - Target a setuid root program, gives you root shell

Shellcode

```
int main(void) {
    char* name[1];
    name[0] = "/bin/sh";
    name[1] = NULL;
    execve(name[0], name, NULL);
    return 0;
}
```

take the compiled output?

Shellcode

There are some restrictions


1. Shellcode cannot contain null characters ‘\0’
 - Why?
2. If payload is via gets() must also avoid line-breaks
 - Why?

Payload is not always robust

Exact address of the shellcode start is not always easy to guess

Miss? Segfault


Fix? NOP Sled!



NOP Sled!

- NOP instruction: 0x90
- Instruct eip to move on to the next instruction


Stack after injecting shellcode and pointing eip to the memory address to a NOP sled leading to the shellcode being executed



Build your very own NOP sled

Information we have

- char buffer[100] <- overflow this buffer
- address of char buffer is 0xffffd88c
- eip = 50 byte offset from char buffer[100]
- shellcode = 20 bytes



Other overflow targets

- Format strings in C
- Heap management structures used by malloc

Integer overflows

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
    unsigned short s;
    int i;
    char buf[80];

    if(argc < 3){
        return -1;
    }

    i = atoi(argv[1]);
    s = i;

    if(s >= 80) { /* [w1] */
        printf("Oh no you don't!\n");
        return -1;
    }

    printf("s = %d\n", s);

    memcpy(buf, argv[2], i);
    buf[i] = '\0';
    printf("%s\n", buf);

    return 0;
}
```

Integer overflows

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
    unsigned short s;
    int i;
    char buf[80];

    if(argc < 3){
        return -1;
    }
```

```
i = atoi(argv[1]);
s = i;

if(s >= 80) {      /* [w1] */
    printf("Oh no you don't!\n");
    return -1;
}

printf("s = %d\n", s);

memcpy(buf, argv[2], i);
buf[i] = '\0';
printf("%s\n", buf);

return 0;
}
```

Output

\$./overflow 5 hello

s = 5

hello

\$./overflow 80 hello

Oh no you don't

\$./65536 hello

s = 0

Segmentation fault (core dumped)

What's wrong with this code?

```
#define BUF_SIZE 16
char buf[BUF_SIZE];
void vulnerable()
{
    int len = read_int_from_network();
    char *p = read_string_from_network();
    if(len > BUF_SIZE) {
        printf("Too large\n");
        return;
    }
    memcpy(buf, p, len);
}
```

```
void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
typedef unsigned int size_t;
```

- A. Nothing
- B. Buffer overflow
- C. Integer overflow
- D. Race Condition

Variable arguments in C

- In C, we can define a function with a variable number of arguments

```
void printf(const char* format,...)
```

Usage:

```
printf("hello world");
```

```
printf("length of %s = %d \n", str, str.length());
```

format specification encoded by special % characters

Sloppy use of printf

```
void main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    printf( argv[1] );
}
```

Sloppy use of printf

```
void main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    printf( argv[1] );
}
```

argv[1] = "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s"

Attacker controls format string gives all sorts of control:

- Print stack contents
- Print arbitrary memory
- Write to arbitrary memory

Implementation of printf

- Special functions `va_start`, `va_arg`, `va_end`
compute arguments at run-time

```
void printf(const char* format, ...)  
{  
    int i; char c; char* s; double d;  
    va_list ap; /* declare an "argument pointer" to a variable arg list */  
    va_start(ap, format); /* initialize arg pointer using last known arg */  
  
    for (char* p = format; *p != '\0'; p++) {  
        if (*p == '%') {  
            switch (*++p) {  
                case 'd':  
                    i = va_arg(ap, int); break;  
                case 's':  
                    s = va_arg(ap, char*); break;  
                case 'c':  
                    c = va_arg(ap, char); break;  
                }  
                ... /* etc. for each % specification */  
            }  
        }  
        ...  
  
        va_end(ap); /* restore any special stack manipulations */  
    }
```

printf has an internal
stack pointer

Viewing the stack

We can show some parts of the stack memory by using a format string like this:



C code `printf ("%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x\n");`

Output `40012980.080628c4.bffff7a4.00000005.08059c04`

instruct printf:

- retrieve 5 parameters
- display them as 8-digit padded hexadematic numbers

Closer look at the stack



Format specification encoded by special % characters

Format Specifiers

Parameter	Meaning	Passed as
%d	decimal (int)	value
%u	unsigned decimal (unsigned int)	value
%x	hexadecimal (unsigned int)	value
%s	string ((const) (unsigned) char *)	reference
%n	number of bytes written so far, (* int)	reference

The %n format specifier

```
void main()
{
    int count=0;
    printf("Hello%n", &count);
}
```

The %n format specifier

- **%n** format symbol tells printf to write the number of characters that have been printed

```
printf("Overflow this!%n", &myVar);
```

- Argument of printf is interpreted as destination address
- This writes 14 into myVar (“Overflow this!” has 14 characters)

- What if printf does not have an argument?

```
char buf[16] = "Overflow this!%n";
printf(buf);
```

- Stack location pointed to by printf’s internal stack pointer will be interpreted as address into which the number of characters will be written.